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A comprehensive monitoring system has been 
developed to alert personnel of hazards which may 
develop while they are performing tests on a radio-
isotope thermoelectric generator (RTG). The monitor-
ing system also initiates remedial action so as to 
minimize damage to the RTG test equipment and to 
protect personnel. 
The diagram depicts the apparatus and monitoring 
system used for testing a spacecraft RTG in a thermal-
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vacuum environment. Thermoelectric junctions in 
contact with the hot surface of a capsule containing 
a radioisotope and with a cold surface (for example, 
the outer container of the RTG which radiates heat 
to a cold thermal shroud within the test chamber) are 
connected in series-parallel so as to generate electric 
power. Six sensors in the test system monitor five 
operating conditions: hot junction temperature, cold 
junction temperature, thermal shroud coolant flow, 
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vacuum in the test chamber, and alpha radiation (two 
sensors). Each sensor (except one radiation sensor) is 
adjusted so that it triggers a malfunction signal when 
a specific operating condition deviates from a pre-
determined level. The malfunction signal activates 
circuitry which initiates an alarm sequence and ap-
propriate emergency procedures which correct or 
minimize the malfunction. The emergency procedures 
and alarm sequences, which can also be initiated 
manually for test or in the event of unforeseen 
emergency, are described below. 
Abnormal increase in hot junction temperature. A 
temperature sensor at the hot junction is connected 
to a temperature controller that has two adjustable 
signal points. The first point is set so as to generate a 
signal when the hot junction is at a temperature 
slightly above (approximately 10°C) its normal op-
erating temperature. The signal activates audio and 
visual alarms in the test area and activates alarms at 
a continuously manned remote control center. The 
signal also energizes a relay which in turn short-
circuits the electric power output of the RTG; short-
circuiting causes an increase in Peltier cooling, which 
normally brings the hot junction temperature back to 
the normal operating range. 
If the temperature continues to rise, a second signal 
point on the temperature controller generates a signal 
when the hot junction reaches a temperature approx-
imately 25°C above the normal operating temperature 
of the hot junction. The second signal activates cir-
cuits which close the main vacuum valve to seal off 
the vacuum chamber and, after a delay of 15 seconds, 
cause release of an inert gas into the vacuum chamber 
until the chamber pressure reaches approximately 80 
kN/m2. The chamber pressure is maintained below 
atmospheric to avoid the possibility of escape of 
radioactive material. The inert gas also reduces the 
hot junction temperature by convective heat transfer 
from the outer surface of the RTG to the cool thermal 
shroud (and within the RTG by conductive heat 
transfer); a temperature drop of up to 95°C can be 
easily achieved. The inert gas also prevents possible 
oxidation or sublimation of materials in the hot 
generator. 
- Abnormal increase in cold junction temperature. A 
temperature sensor on the cold outer container of the 
RTG is connected to a second controller set to pro-
vide a signal when the temperature reaches an ab-
normal value (approximately 8°C above the normal
outer-wall operating temperature). As described 
above, this signal also activates alarms and circuitry 
which simultaneously close the vacuum valve, and, 
after a delay of 15 seconds, open a gas injection valve. 
Open circuit in the RTG. Any open circuit in the 
RTG electric-load output circuit causes an abnormal 
increase in the hot junction temperature. An increase 
in output voltage to an abnormally high value also 
produces the same effect. If these malfunctions occur, 
the hot-junction two-point controller initiates the ac-
tions first described above, and an electronic load 
control brings the output voltage back to a preset 
value. 
Loss of coolant flow or loss of vacuum in the test 
chamber also actuate all audio and visual alarms and 
the circuitry which short-circuits the electric power 
output, closes the vacuum valve, and introduces gas 
to the chamber. 
Release of radioactivity into the test chamber. In 
this instance, it is imperative to confine radioactivity 
to the interior of the vacuum chamber. Two alpha-
radiation sensors are located within the chamber; any 
release of alpha particles causes the first sensor to 
generate a signal which activates alarms as described 
above and a special alarm system which signals a 
nuclear hazard; the main vacuum valve is closed. The 
second alpha sensor is used to confirm the operation 
of the first sensor and to record the amount of radi-
ation within the chamber. This information is used 
by the test engineer to analyze the malfunction and 
to determine a course of corrective action. 
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